

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5369

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 7, 1976

(SALT TWO - 1053)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTZR
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 7, 1976.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JULY 7, 1976

I

IN ORDER TO MOVE AHEAD CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARD REACHING
AGREEMENT ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS,
THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE JUNE 23, 1976 MEETING TABLED NEW
REVISED WORDING FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, WHICH TAKES INTO
ACCOUNT THE RESULTS OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION.

SINCE THE QUESTION OF DEFINING HEAVY BOMBERS WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WAS AGAIN RAISED AT DELEGA-

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TION MEETINGS, AS WELL AS IN CONVERSATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO

EXPRESS SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROBLEMS RELATING THERETO.

IT FOLLOWS FROM THE JUNE 23 STATEMENT OF THE USSR DELEGATION AND THE JUNE 30, 1976 STATEMENT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION THAT AT PRESENT POINTS OF CONTACT IN THE VIEWS OF THE SIDES HAVE EMERGED, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING FUTURE AIRCRAFT AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

AT THE SAME TIME, WITHIN THE RANGE OF QUESTIONS DISCUSSED BETWEEN US IN CONNECTION WITH REACHING AGREEMENTS ON ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, THERE ARE STILL SOME ON WHICH WE ARE NOT OF ONE MIND.

THUS, THE FORMULA "TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HOWEVER CONFIGURED," USED IN THE U.S. WORDING FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE EXPLANATIONS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, PROVIDES FOR INCLUSION, AMONG THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, OF TANKER AIRCRAFT, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT OF ONE OF THE SIDES, ALTHOUGH, AS YOU KNOW, SUCH AN APPROACH SHARPLY CONFLICTS WITH THE CONTENT OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON IN CONNECTION WITH ESTABLISHING THE BASIC PARAMETERS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN VLADIVOSTOK. IN DEED, THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 SPECIFIES IN A CLEAR-CUT MANNER THAT WITHIN THE 2,400 EQUAL OVERALL LIMIT BEING ESTABLISHED, IN ADDITION TO THE LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, IT IS NOT "TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HOWEVER CONFIGURED" THAT WILL BE LIMITED, BUT PRECISELY HEAVY BOMBERS IF THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.

THE U.S. SIDE SPEAKS OF AIRCRAFT WHICH ALLEGEDLY COULD "BE UTILIZED FOR THE DELIVERY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OR ADAPTED TO SUCH USE IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME." IN THIS CONNECTION, MENTION IS MADE OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE NOT HEAVY BOMBERS.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT AN APPROACH OF THAT KIND
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IS UTTERLY UNFOUNDED.

AS ALREADY EMPHASIZED HERE, THE TANKER AIRCRAFT EXISTING IN THE USSR ARE A SPECIAL MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT DEVELOPED FOR USE PRECISELY AS TANKERS. THE SAME THING APPLIES ALSO TO SOVIET RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT. ALL THESE AIRCRAFT WERE DESIGNED AND BUILT TO CARRY OUT IMPORTANT MISSIONS WHICH HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON

WITH THE MISSION CARRIED OUT BY HEAVY BOMBERS. THEREFORE, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE AFOREMENTIONED SPECIAL AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE UTILIZED FOR THE DELIVERY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OR ADAPTED TO SUCH USE, AND THE VERY THOUGHT OF SUCH REBUILDING IS IRRATIONAL.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ENSURE DRAWING A CLEAR-CUT DISTINCTION BETWEEN A HEAVY BOMBER ON THE ONE HAND, AND A TANKER AIRCRAFT, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE ON THE OTHER, NO MATTER ON THE BASIS OF WHAT AIRCRAFT THE LATTER WERE DEVELOPED.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE SOVIET SIDE--AND WE SPOKE OF THIS AT THE JUNE 23, 1976 MEETING--PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE TANKER AIRCRAFT, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD MANIFESTLY CONFLICT WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.

AT THE SAME TIME, TO ADVANCE TERMS, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE TANKER AIRCRAFT, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT OF ONE SIDE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS, WHILE THE SAME AIRCRAFT OF THE OTHER SIDE WOULD REMAIN OUTSIDE THE LIMITATIONS, WOULD RADICALLY CONFLICT WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

SINCE THE U.S. SIDE RAISES THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON THE AFOREMENTIONED AIRCRAFT, THEN, IF THE QUESTION OF SOME KIND OF LIMITATION ON TANKER AIRCRAFT, ON RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT WERE TO BE CONSIDERED AT ALL, THEN, OF COURSE, THE TERMS OF SUCH LIMITATIONS MUST BE THE SAME FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS IS PRECISELY WHY WE SPOKE IN FAVOR OF ESTABLISHING AGGREGATE
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NUMERICAL LEVELS, EQUAL FOR THE USSR AND THE U.S., FOR TANKER AIRCRAFT, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT, AND OF ASSUMING MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS NOT TO CONVERT THEM INTO HEAVY BOMBERS. THERE IS NOT DOUBT THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD FULLY ENSURE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE SIDES IN COMPLIANCE WITH THIS OBLIGATION.

SUCH AN APPROACH, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE FOR THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, ITSELF, WE WOULD THINK, ENSURES THE SOLUTION OF RELEVANT ISSUES IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, ADOPTED BY THE SIDES, ON WHICH, AS DECIDED IN VLADIVOSTOK, THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL BE BASED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5369

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II

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION ALSO WISHES TO SET FORTH ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH WORKING OUT THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THE RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 23, 1976.

AS WE HAVE EMPHASIZED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, THE APPROACH TO THE DEFINITION OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND TO RELATED PROVISIONS, SET FORTH BY THE SOVIET SIDE, IS BASED ON STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH PROVIDES THAT IT IS LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS PRECISELY THAT ARE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION WITHIN THE 2,400 AGGREGATE LEVEL.

ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE DRAFT--AND HERE, AS IS CLEAR FROM THE U.S. DELEGATION'S JUNE 23, 1976 STATEMENT, THERE ARE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US--WILL MAKE USE OF THE DEFINITION EMPLOYED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, SPECIFYING ICBM RANGE IN KILOMETERS.

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TO ACCOMMODATE THE WISHES OF THE U.S. SIDE, WE PROPOSED--
AND BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED UPON THIS--THAT CONVERSION OF
MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT ICBM LAUNCHERS INTO LAUNCHERS
FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS BE PROHIBITED.

AT THE JUNE 9, 1976 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION, PUR-
SUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS, TABLED FOR CONSIDERATION AND AGREED
STATEMENT FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
TERM "ICBM LAUNCHERS," AS USED IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, INCLUDES
SUCH LAUNCHERS AS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED
FOR LAUNCHING LAND-BASED ICBMS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
OBLIGATION ON NON-CONVERSION UNDER ARTICLE IV, THIS MEANS THAT
THE SIDES COULD NOT HAVE ANY LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WHICH
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCH-
ING ICBMS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE SIDES PROVIDE ADEQUATE
AND RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT WHICH MISSILE LAUNCHERS ARE
LAUNCHED DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS.
AS YOU KNOW, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE MEANS IN TERMS OF THE
NEED TO ENSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS
BEING ASSUMED IS FULLY CONFIRMED BY THE PRACTICE OF IMPLEMENT-
ING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH IS IN FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS,
THE AGREED STATEMENT FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, PROPOSED BY
THE SOVIET SIDE, CONTAINS ALL THAT IS NECESSARY AND SUFFI-
CIENT FOR THE SIDES TO BE ABLE TO DETERMINE WITH CONFIDENCE,
USING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WHICH MISSILE LAUNCHERS ARE
TO BE COUNTED WITHIN THE 2,400 OVERALL LIMIT.

MR. AMBASSADOR, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION
ONCE AGAIN TO THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN USING THE WORD "TYPE"
IN THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, PROPOSED BY
THE U.S. DELEGATION.

UNDER SUCH AN APPROACH, MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE BY
NO MEANS LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS COULD ARBITRARILY AND
UNJUSTIFIABLY BE INCLUDED AMONG THE LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS.
THE EXPLANATIONS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE JUNE 23, 1976
MEETING COULD ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THIS WAY. AN APPROACH

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OF THAT KIND, HOWEVER, WOULD BE DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE
AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE
LIMITATION OF PRECISELY LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WITHIN

THE 2,400 LIMIT. FOR THIS REASON THE USE OF THE TERM "TYPE" IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY CITED DETAILED ARGUMENTS ON THIS QUESTION. YOU KNOW THEM.

AS FOR THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE TERM "ICBM LAUNCHERS," AS USED IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, INCLUDES SUCH TAUNCHERS AS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING LAND-BASED ICBMS, IT ENSURES PRECISE EMBODIMENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT OF THE DECISIONS RECORDED IN VLADIVOSTOK. AND, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS IS WHAT CONSTITUTES OUR TASK.

THE DELEGATIONS ALSO DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF THE U.S. SIDE'S USE OF THE MAY 26, 1972 DATE IN ITS DRAFT OF AN AGREED STATEMENT. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO NEED WHATSOEVER FOR USING ANY DATE IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 1. IT WOULD ONLY LEAD TO AMBIGUITIES AND DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS. THE QUESTION OF THE ACTUAL STATUS IN WHICH THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED, AND CONSEQUENTLY ALSO LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, ARE SUBJECT TO BEING COUNTED WITHIN THE 2,400 LEVEL, IS RESOLVED BY THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI.

IN ADDITION, THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT OF THE AGREED STATEMENT SPEAKS OF "FACTS", WHICH FURTHERMORE ARE MERELY "EXAMPLES," WHICH IN YOUR OPINION COULD SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT A LAUNCHER HAS CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT REFERENCE TO EXAMPLES DOES NOT MEET THE PURPOSES OF SUCH AN AUTHORITATIVE DOCUMENT AS THE NEW AGREEMENT, ON THE DRAFT OF WHICH WE ARE WORKING. IT CAN ONLY INTRODUCE SUBJECTIVISM INTO THE UNDERSTANDING BY THE SIDES OF THE FORMULATIONS WHICH IN THEIR MEANING MUST BE OF UTMOST PRECISION AND CLARITY. ALL THIS SHOWS THAT THIS APPROACH, INSTEAD OF MAKING THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT MORE PRECISE, LEADS TO VAGUENESS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ARBITRARY INTERPRETATIONS, AND THERE-
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FORE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

SUCH ARE THE CONSIDERATIONS WE WANTED TO SET FORTH TODAY IN CONNECTION WITH WORKING OUT THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE USEFUL IN THE FURTHER WORK OF AGREEING UPON THE AFOREMENTIONED QUESTIONS. JOHNSON

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